















Drastic technological changes are cyclical because basic R&D is carried on only at 
times when entrepreneurial profits for incremental technologies of the prevailing 
technological paradigm fall close to zero. The model is essentially an endogenous 
technological change framework. Varieties, input to the final good production, are 
composite goods. Each composite good is produced by a set of intermediaries, 
outgrowths of basic R&D and applied R&D. The basic intermediate, product of 
basic R&D, is modeled as in Romer (1990). Complementary intermediates, the 
outgrowths of applied R&D, do show the property of falling profits. The falling 
character of profits implies that basic R&D becomes more yielding than applied 
R&D at certain points in time. Research people switch back and forth between the 
applied and basic research sectors, creating (endogenous) cycles in the 
advancement of drastic technologies and economic activity. 
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It has been first debated by Kondratieff (1926) that capitalism has long waves, regular 
fluctuations in economic life with a wavelength of 45-60 years. Schumpeter (1939) 
proposed that the cause of long-run cycles might involve discontinuities in the process 
of drastic technical innovation. Historical evidence indeed indicates that neither 
production nor technological progress is a smooth process, and that major innovations 
tend to appear in clusters in certain periods (Olsson, 2001; Gordon, 2000; Mokyr 
1990; Kleinknecht, 1987; van Duijn, 1983; Mensch, 1979). 
Given the significant effect of technological change on economic growth (Romer, 
1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992), a better 
understanding of the reasons behind the cyclical evolution of output and technology is 
important from a policy perspective. In particular, smoothing out the cyclical 
advancement may bring about improvement in the long-run performance of an 
economy. 
Surprisingly, however, the clustered appearance of drastic technologies has not 
received much attention in the growth theory. Relatively recently, David (1990) and 
especially Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) have made the term general-purpose 
technology (GPT) popular to the growth theory. The main aim of this literature is to 
emphasize the difference between drastic technologies and incremental technological 
changes in terms of their growth implications. Currently, the focus seems to be on 
whether an economy experiences a slowdown at the onset of a new technological 
change due to reallocation of resources from the old to the new sectors or not (see 
several chapters in Helpman, 1998). Hence, the focus is on the temporary cyclical 
effects that may be created by new technological paradigms at the onset of their 
introduction to the economy. 
In this paper we take a different focus. The aim of this study is to show why drastic 
technological change tends to proceed in a cyclical fashion and how the long-run 
growth process is affected by this. We conjecture that the main factor behind 
observing that drastic technological changes appear in clusters is eventually 
exhausting profit opportunities in incremental technologies of the existing 
technological paradigm.  
2 The model we employ to substantiate our claim is essentially an extension of 
Romer (1990). The model consists of two R&D-sectors, labeled basic and applied, 
which respectively generate basic innovations for basic intermediary sectors and 
applied innovations for complementary intermediate sectors. In particular, we suppose 
that each basic innovation (i.e., drastic technology change) leads to the emergence of 
one basic intermediary good and n complementary intermediary goods. These n+1 
intermediaries are used in the production of a composite good, which becomes a 
variety in the production of final good. Indeed, each new composite good pushes 
upward the production frontier of the final good. There are two types of inputs in the 
model, physical capital and labor. Labor is further divided into three types, namely 
unskilled labor, skilled labor, and research labor, each of which is demanded only in 
one sector: unskilled labor enhances final good production (together with composite 
good varieties), skilled labor is used in the production of complementary intermediate 
sectors, and research labor is employed in R&D sectors. Finally, capital is used in the 
production of the basic intermediary good in the form of foregone output. 
A good example to the idea that we advance here is perhaps the computer. Suppose 
that the microprocessor represents the GPT (basic technology) innovation and 
hardware and software are the complementary applied technology innovations. 
Producers of intermediaries, each a monopolist, purchase patents of these 
technologies. The basic intermediate sector uses capital to produce microprocessors 
and the complementary intermediaries use skilled labor to produce the hardware and 
software. The computer, the outgrowth of assembling the microprocessor, the 
hardware, and the software, is a composite good and a variety (input) in Gross 
Domestic Production (GDP). 
The crucial aspect of the model is that it generates declining profits among   
“varieties” in the complementary sector. That is, each additional complementary 
innovation yields lower monopoly profits. The monopoly profits of intermediate 
sectors are transferred to R&D people in the form of wages (cf. Romer, 1990) and 
researchers will continue to exploit positive profit opportunities of a prevailing 
technological paradigm by making incremental, non-drastic innovations. As profit 
opportunities become exhausted, at a certain point, it becomes more yielding to invest 
in a new technological paradigm. Researchers then switch to work on the next drastic 
innovation (technological paradigm). Incremental innovation resumes within the new 
n
3 paradigm and endures until profit opportunities fall close to zero again. Thus, drastic 
technological change and economic development proceeds in long waves. 
The model contributes to the (growth) literature in several ways. First, it develops a 
formal model of a mechanism that creates endogenous long-run fluctuations in 
economic activity. Second, it introduces asymmetry in the intermediate market, which 
is rarely done in the literature.
1 This paper shows that asymmetric profit opportunities 
in the intermediate sector(s) are a lot more than a detail. Indeed, our paper shows that 
the falling character of these profits is the genuine source of economic fluctuations. 
Third, the model contributes to the literature on elaborating the causes of a possible 
slowdown at the onset of a new GPT. As such, our model generates insights in policy 
options to pursue when trying to overcome the temporary economic decline when new 
GPT’s are introduced. Last but not least, our model elaborates on the role of basic and 
applied R&D mechanisms in the growth process. It shows that the impact of these two 
R&D sectors in the long-run growth process is significantly different. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the production 
structure of the model. Section 3 solves the model at the “GPT” equilibrium, the 
equilibrium point where the stock of basic technologies is given. An important finding 
of this section is that profit opportunities in the complementary sectors are falling 
towards zero across the varieties. In section 4 we look at the long-run equilibrium and 
the R&D switching generated in the model. This section shows that the exhausting 
profits in complementary intermediary-goods sectors are the source of fluctuations in 
economic activity. Section 5 analyzes the growth implications of long-run business 
cycles. Section 6 summarizes our findings and concludes. 
 
 
2 The  Production  Structure 
 
Consider an economy where the final good Y production technology is represented 
by 
 
                                                           
1 To our knowledge, van Zon and Yetkiner (2003) is the only work studying asymmetric intermediate 
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with   representing unskilled labor that is solely used in the production of the final 
good (say, GDP) and with   being a composite good that reflects the use of all 
technological paradigms i  that are available. The higher the  , the more 
recent the GPT that a composite good (or any other variable) is associated with. The 
final good sector is furthermore a perfectly competitive market and 
L
i z
2 , 1 B ,..., = i
β − 1  indicates the 
partial output elasticity of unskilled labor. 
Each composite good, or technological paradigm, is produced by   
intermediaries. Unlike most endogenous technological change models, we thus use a 
vector of composite rather than single inputs in the production function of the final 
good 
1 + n
Y . This is in line with the distinction we will make below between the basic 
R&D sector, which invents drastic innovations that have a potential to grow into new 
technological paradigms, and the applied R&D sector, which produces many 
complementary innovations to make that happen. As such, we will consider one of the 
 intermediaries as the basic or core intermediary, whereas all the other 
intermediaries are dubbed applied intermediaries. 
1 + n
















j α 0 > j α  (2) 
 
where   is the j ij x
th intermediary used in the production of the i
th composite input, and 
j α  indicates the relative share of j
th input in the total product of composite good  . 
Equation (2) assumes implicitly that 
i z
j i ij ′ =α α  for  B i i ,.., 2 , 1 , ∈ ′ ∀ . We need this 
assumption for a tractable solution. We will show that this assumption does not cause 
any symmetry within a GPT and across GPTs for complementary intermediaries and 
therefore is not as ‘harmful’ as it might be thought at first instance. We associate 
subscript   with the basic intermediary good and 1  with complementary  0 n ,..., 2 ,
5 intermediaries.
2 Consequently,  0 α  and  n α α ,..., 1  are interpreted as the respective 
relative shares of the basic and applied intermediary goods in the total production of a 
composite good. From now on, we shall use 0 and j to designate the core intermediary 
and complementary intermediary related variables and parameters, unless otherwise 
stated. 
j j ′ >α α
j α
The number of complementary intermediaries, n, is a large positive integer, which 
is constant and identical across the composite goods. Hence, the model is ‘forced’ to 
generate the same number of intermediaries along GPTs. This is another assumption 
that we need in order to guarantee a tractable model. Given that n is a very large 
number, this assumption is by no means restrictive though. Also regarding the value 
of  j α , we make several assumptions. First, we assume that complementary 
intermediates are ranked such that   if  j j ′ < ,  n j j ,.., 2 , 1 , ∈ ′ ∀ . This 
assumption is not restrictive since it is a matter of reordering in a Cobb-Douglas 
technology. It is noteworthy in this respect that we do not impose any condition on the 
ordinal value of  0 α . Moreover, the assumption contains that  j′ j ≠α α ; that is, none of 
any pair of  ) ( j, j′ α α  is alike. Second, we assume that  n α  is at the neighborhood of 
zero, which is a reasonable assumption, given that (i) n is a large number, (ii)  j α  are 
in descending order, and (iii) the sum of   is one. The intuition behind this 
reasoning will be clear as we progress. 
The blueprints that are needed to be able to produce intermediary goods are 
forwarded by the R&D sector. We assume that each innovation, whether basic or 
applied, is the result of innovative activities from labor in that sector (labeled R). This 
labor is endowed with the frontier knowledge that is required to do research and can 
be engaged in basic or applied research. The determination of the specific activity the 
research labor engages in depends on the relative profitability of both types of 
innovations, which, in turn, depends on the profitability of adding applied 
intermediate goods to an already existing technological paradigm (for which the basic 
intermediary already exists) versus creating a completely new paradigm (for which a 
new basic intermediary is required). As we will show, the profitability of applied 
intermediaries falls the later it is introduced, so that there is a certain point at which 
                                                           
2 Complementary intermediaries can be associated with “innovational complementarity” character of 
GPTs as advanced by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995). 
6 pursuing basic innovations are more profitable than doing applied research, and 
research labor shifts from doing applied research to doing basic research. Due to the 
stylistic nature of the model, there will be only corner solutions. This implies that R 
labor is either engaged in basic research or in applied research. The right ‘down-to-
earth’ interpretation of this result is that “the intensity of research must be switching 
between applied and basic R&D”. 
We stylistically assume that blueprints of basic and applied intermediaries 
accumulate according to the following technologies: 
 
t B B t t B R B B δ = − +1      t A A B R n n δ ω ω = − +1      (3) 
 
In these equations, t and ω represent time (see below for explanation),   is the stock 
of basic innovations at time t, 
t B
B δ  and  A δ  represent the productivity of the blueprint 
generation process for, respectively, the basic and applied innovations, and where   
and   is the amount of research people used in generating blueprints either for the 
basic sector or for the applied sector (for the most recent GPT). The critical difference 
between the two blueprint accumulation functions is that the accumulation over time 
of the applied innovations is not a function of previous applied R&D efforts, 
irrespective of the ‘age’ of the paradigm, while the stock of basic technology is a 
positive externality for both accumulation functions. The motivation for this is that the 
outcome of applied research is assumed to be too specific to be directly useful for 
other applied research. A deeper reason behind this assumption is our perception that 
basic knowledge is the true engine of increasing productivity in an economy (this is 
accounted for in the applied R&D blueprint accumulation function by linking applied 




Whatever the specific engagement of R&D labor, the output of research labor is 
always an innovation, which we assume is patented and which serves as an input to 
the production of intermediary goods. The costs of producing intermediate goods, 
therefore, include the costs of getting hold of the patent. Next to that we assume that 
the production of complementary intermediaries takes high-skilled labor (H), whereas 
the production of the basic intermediate good requires capital in the form of forgone 
output. Hence, the total costs of intermediate production can be portrayed as: 
7  
0 0 , 0) ( i i i x r P x TC η + =  and TC ij h j i ij h w P x + = , ) (      (4) 
 
In these equations,     is the price of the patent of the i j i P, n j ,..., 1 , 0 =
th GPT, r and   
respectively denote the cost of capital and high-skilled labor, h  is the amount of 
skilled labor used in the production of applied intermediate  , and 
h w
ij
ij x 0 i x η  stands for 
the units of resources in terms of foregone output that is required to produce  . 0 i x
3 Our 
motivation behind modeling the input use of the complementary intermediary sector 
different than of the basic intermediary sector is our perception that the production of 
a basic intermediary requires “something more fundamental” than the production of a 
complementary intermediary. We capture this difference by differentiating their input 
needs. If we continue with our computer example, the production of the processor 
(i.e., the basic intermediate) requires immense investment in resources that currently 
only two firms, under the big dominance of one, can operate globally. On the other 
hand, we observe many firms are able to produce a complementary intermediary, 
which indicates the ‘easiness’ of its production in terms of resources required. 
This concludes the description of the production side of the economy. To sum up, 
we have three distinct types of labor that one way or the other all contribute to the 
economy’s final good production. In a way, final goods production starts with 
research labor R, which is engaged in either basic or applied innovative activities. 
This generates patented ideas for drastic or applied intermediary goods, which are 
produced at a certain capital cost (basic intermediaries) or by means of high-skilled 
labor  H (complementary intermediaries). Any basic intermediary, along with its 
outgrowth of applied intermediaries, serves as a distinct, composite input –labeled a 
technological paradigm– for the production of final goods. Finally, low-skilled labor L 
is needed to transform all technological paradigms into final goods. 
Before we proceed, it is instrumental to discuss how we perceive time in our 
model. This is important since in our set-up we have basic innovations that need time 
to grow into paradigms by means of having applied intermediaries (i.e., the 
evolvement over time of n), whereas the model also features discrete growth steps 
                                                           
3 We will change the notation of   slightly in Section 4. For presentational purposes, we denote in 
that way at this introductory level. 
j i P,
8 when new paradigms evolve (the process by which B changes over time). In our 
discussion we will therefore consider three concepts of time. First, there is real time or 
calendar time, denoted by s, which is continuous and is used in usual way to, for 
instance, assess the evolvement of GDP over time. Second, we index the time points 
at which the model-economy realizes jumps in the drastic technology stocks by t and 
call it GPT-time. The difference between t and t+1 is therefore the real time needed to 
complete a new paradigm; that is, to get from   to  . t B 1 + t B
4 Third, we use the concept 
of applied R&D time, to be denoted by ω. These are time points on the real time line 
between t and t+1 that index the evolvement of applied innovations. As we show, 
basic R&D and applied R&D do not take place simultaneously but follow another 
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Figure 1. Associating inventions with real time 
 
 
For discussing equilibria in our model, this implies that we may distinguish 
between types of equilibria as well. First, we can distinguish production equilibrium, 
which gives all relations between the endogenous variables that should hold at any 
                                                           
4 Note that each GPT time-block includes the invention of blueprints first for complementary 
intermediaries and next for the basic intermediary. We find this timing more useful as the inclusion of 
the next-generation basic technology does not change the interpretation. 
9 GPT time, given wages and given the cost of patents. These are typically the 
conditions that result from profit maximization in final goods and intermediate goods 
production. Next, we may distinguish a ‘market equilibrium’, which also determines 
the wages that should hold, but still ignores the evolvement over time of technological 
paradigms. Together, we call these two equilibria GPT equilibrium. This equilibrium 
will yield a specification for the final output of the economy as a function of factor 
endowments, the rental cost of capital and the number of technological paradigms. 
Third, and most interesting, we can consider the long-run equilibrium. This is the 
equilibrium that also incorporates the progress of B over time, thus identifying the real 
time evolvement of Y as a function of exogenous variables only. Finally, we may 
differentiate the equilibria under intertemporally optimized preferences and under 
exogenously determined consumption assumptions. In the latter case, the interest rate 
r  is constant and identical, which is consistent with the stylized facts of growth, at 
least in the long-run equilibria. 
 
 
3  The GPT Equilibrium 
 
To determine the GPT equilibrium, we first identify the economic relations that 
should hold between the alternative phases of final goods production that we have 
dubbed production equilibrium. A representative firm’s profits are 
 




i Y − − = Π ∑ ∑
− β β 1        ( 5 )  
 
where we have normalized the price of Y to one and where   and   respectively 
denote the user cost (price) of the composite input   and unskilled labor L. First 
order conditions with respect to   and   are 
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10  
These equations can be used to determine the inverse input demand function for any 
intermediate product by linking them to profit maximization in composite good 
production. To do that let us suppose that the intermediary-good prices are denoted by 
, in which the first price is associated with the core sector,  , and 
others are associated by the complementary sector,  . Then, total cost 
corresponding to the composite good i is C . Minimizing total costs 
subject to equation (2) yields 
) ,...., , ( 1 0 in i i q q q 0 i x
) ,...., ( 1 in i x x
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The summation of equation (8) over  j  gives  i i i z C λ = . That is, the cost of producing 
the composite intermediate   is the shadow price of composite input times quantity. 
Hence, 
i z
i λ  works also as a unit-price   of composite input i.  i p
Substituting the optimum condition for the j
th intermediary of the i
th GPT,  , from 





















λ .          ( 9 )  
 
This shows that the shadow price of the i
th composite input,  i λ , is a kind of geometric 
average of intermediate-good prices weighted by their respective input shares. Note 
that equation (9) is a straightforward extension of a two-input cost minimization 
problem under Cobb-Douglas technology. 
Using equations (6) and (9) in equation (8) gives the inverse input-demand 
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11 where 1 ) 1 /( 1 > − = β σ  is the inverse of partial output elasticity of unskilled labor. 
Profit maximization in the intermediary sector is handled à la Romer (1990). Let us 
first consider the core sector, indexed by  . The derived demand function of the core 
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As equation (11) indicates,   is inversely related with its own price. Throughout this 
study, we assume that prices of other intermediary goods (complementary goods in 
this case) do not have any (cross) price effect. 
0 i x
Following Romer (1990, pp. S85-S88.) we assume there is a monopolist holding 
patent rights of the basic intermediary associated with a GPT. Given the cost structure 
of intermediate good production (cf. equation 4), the profit equation of any 
intermediary firm in the core sector is 
 
0 0 0 0 i i i i x r x q η π − =          ( 1 2 )  
 
where we recall our assumption that each unit of production uses  0 i x η  units of 
resources in terms of foregone output. Profit maximization leads to the well-known 
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In (13),  1 ) 1 ( 1 0 0 > − + = α σ ε  is the own price elasticity of input  , and markup rate  0 i x
0 ) 1 (
1
α σ −
0 1 φ + =  is greater than one ( 1 0 > φ ). It must be noted that the price of the 
core-intermediary is symmetric along ‘generations’ only if the rental cost of capital r  
is identical along the generations. Finally, we note that there is an inverse hyperbolic 
relationship between  0 φ  and  0 α  such that  0 φ  is monotonically declining in  0 α , i.e., 
0 0 < / 0 ∂ ∂ α φ . 
12 For the complementary sector, indexed by 1 , the results of profit 
maximization are to a large extent similar. When a GPT and the basic intermediate of 
that drastic technology appear in the market, the idea but the patent is a public good. 
If profit opportunities in the intermediate market are sufficiently high, then blueprints 
of complementary goods will be developed by the applied R&D sector.
n ,..., 2 ,
 Using these 
blueprints, monopolists of the intermediate sector produce complementary 
intermediaries. 
We recall that the main input in the production of complementary intermediaries is 
skilled labor. We assume one unit of skilled labor produces one unit of 
complementary-intermediate,  ij ij h x = ,  n j ,..., 2 , 1 ∈ ∀ , where   is the amount of 
skilled labor used in the production of intermediate good  . Perfect factor mobility 
across complementary sectors within each GPT and across GPT sectors implies a 


















. As before, the inverse hyperbolic relationship holds 
between φ  and  j α . Given our assumptions on  j α  (cf. Section 2), this implies that 
there is an inverse relationship between the “order of appearance” of complementary 
intermediates in the market and the markup rate. That is, the later a complementary 
input enters the market, the higher its mark-up will be. To see this intuitively, recall 
that  j′ > j α α  if  j j ′ <  and that  n α  is at the neighborhood of zero. Consider now  . 
Its relative input share in total product of composite input is at the neighborhood of 
zero but it is marginally the most critical input in the sense that the production of the 
composite good is impossible without it, though all other core and complementary 
inputs could have been produced. In other words, relatively speaking,   has the 
highest importance among all complementary intermediates in the production of the 
composite good. Therefore, the markup over unit cost is the highest, though it is the 
last in the order of appearance. Economically, this also makes sense, since later 
complementary sectors have lower input shares in the total product of the composite 
n x
n x
13 good and therefore face lower price elasticities. Therefore, relatively speaking, they 
can charge higher prices for their intermediaries to exploit the positive profit 
opportunities of their product. 
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Equation (15) shows the inverse relationship between demand for any intermediate 
good and the rental costs of inputs in the production of intermediaries. 
This finalizes the production equilibrium relations that should hold in our 
economy. To get to market equilibrium (i.e., GPT equilibrium), recall that we 
assumed the use of skilled labor is limited to complementary sector. Under this 
assumption, for given supply, it is straightforward to calculate ‘sector-specific’ rental 
price of skilled labor  .   h w
Let us suppose that we are at GPT equilibrium, the state that a cluster of new 
composite goods (a cluster of basic intermediaries together with their complementary 
inputs) has been just added to the production frontier. Then, the demand-supply 
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. Note that (i)  1 0 < < χ  
due to the fact that  β β α < 0 , (ii) G  and G  are constants due to our assumptions 
that   is constant and identical across GPTs and that 
1 2
ij n j i′ =α α  for  , 
and (iii) G  and G .
B ,..., 2 , 1 ∈ i i, ′ ∀
1 1 < 1 2 <
6 
From equation (17) we infer that skilled labor wages increase as the stock of GPTs 
rises for given  ,  L H , and r . This is a ‘normal’ result in the sense that, as new GPTs 
are introduced, more intermediaries use the same (given) resource. Moreover, an 
increase in H  or a decrease in   will lower skilled wages. An (exogenous) increase 
in the supply of skilled labor will certainly have a direct impact on its own price. The 
latter is the result of a rather indirect mechanism. A decrease in   lowers the ‘demand 
for composite inputs’ due to lower final good production. Consequently, the demand 
for complementary inputs is undercut and hence wages for skilled labor decreases. 
L
L
The equilibrium price of a complementary product   mimics the skilled labor 
wage (cf. equation (14) and (17)). However, we recall that complementary-goods 
prices are “asymmetric” along varieties within a GPT because   is a function of 
input-share parameters. Thus, ‘later’ complementary intermediates charge higher 
prices. As we explained before, this makes intuitively sense since an intermediary that 
enters the market later becomes pivotal in finishing the composite good, which is 
captured in the model by an increase in monopoly power. 
j q
j q
The equilibrium value of each complementary intermediate can be calculated by 
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6 To see this, note that  , by definition. Then, given the fact that  ) 1 (
1
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. Similarly, given the fact that 
15 Three characteristics of equation (18) are in order. First, equilibrium values of 
intermediaries are dissimilar within a GPT (but identical along GPTs). The first term 
in the parenthesis on the right hand side of the equation is the source of asymmetry 
across complementary goods. Second, the equilibrium value rises with  j α . It is 






∂ ) / (
, which is positive. In other 
words, the earlier the intermediate appears in the market, the higher its equilibrium 
output level. Note that this is inline with our earlier intuition that earlier entrants have 
less monopoly power. Third, the output of complementary intermediaries increases 
with H/B. This is plausible, given that (i) we assumed the number of complementary 
intermediaries per GPT constant, and (ii) complementary intermediaries only use high 
skilled labor. As a consequence, H/B is a direct proxy of the output level of individual 
firms in the complementary intermediate goods sector. 
The profits of the j
th firm in the i
th GPT (in the complementary intermediaries) is 
found by substituting the respective values of   and   from (17) and (18) in profit 
equation 
h w j x





















































=    (19) 
 
The most obvious characteristic of profits in equation (19) is its falling nature in input 
shares. Recall that we assumed  j α  are ranked in a descending order. Thus, the later 
the intermediate appears, the less the profit it earns, according to equation (19). 
Accordingly, whereas prices are higher for firms that enter later, the equilibrium level 
of output is also lower, such that lower profits result. The reasoning for this goes back 
to the inverse relationship between the order of appearance of an intermediate and its 
relative importance in finishing the composite output. As we know, this leads to a 
higher mark-up over marginal cost, but also to lower (monopoly) output levels. In 




























j α 2 1 G <  for any  , it is then always true that G . 
16 addition, the output share by itself is lower for later entrants. As a consequence, it is 
not surprising that profits decline. 
What is the importance of this finding? Under perfect foresight assumption, 
entrepreneurs in the complementary intermediate market would be aware of the profit 
opportunities of all intermediaries 1 to n. Then, a monopolist would prefer to 
produce the intermediate that promises the highest profit opportunity among   
varieties. Hence, the order of appearance of intermediaries is function of the order of 
size of input shares. The assumption we made initially that input shares were ordered 
in a descending form therefore reflects the declining market opportunities in the 
complementary sector. 
n
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This is the equilibrium of  . Note that   implies the following equilibrium profit for 
the basic intermediate (cf. equation (12)): 






























⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ =     (21) 
 
Following  ,  0 x 0 π  are similar across the core sectors (i.e., along the GPTs). 
As we now have all information concerning the composite good, we can proceed to 
find the equilibrium values of ‘aggregate variables’ for the GPT equilibrium. 
Employing (18) and (20) in equation (2) gives us  . Using this value in (1), we can 





                                                           
7 It is helpful to see (i)  , (ii) 1 , and (iii) 
. 
) / ) 1 (( ) 1 ( 0 χ χ βσ α − − = − − σχ βσχ α = + 0
σχ α χ α ) 1 ( 1 0 0 − = −
8 We can calculate aggregate capital and check if the ratio of the two is constant, fitting to stylized 
facts. Aggregate capital is obtained by summing   along the GPTs,  . It is  0 x ∑ ⋅ =
i
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Equation (22) is not very much different than any reduced form final output 
production function but is richer. First, the “technological variety” variable B  is the 
source of endogenous growth in the model, very much like the “love of variety” 
variable in Romer (1990). The basic difference is that B  pushes the output frontier 
forward cyclically (that we will show in the next section). The fundamental similarity 
with the existing literature is that the growth rate of B  is function of level of R&D 
people employed in the basic R&D. We will pursue this point further in the next 
section. Second, unskilled labor and skilled labor are (exogenous) sources of growth 
of output, supposing these variables are allowed to grow over time. Third, though 
applied R&D plays a critical role in terms of producing new composite varieties, it 
does not play any explicit role in the advancement of output growth. Hence, our 
model suggests that we need to reach a better understanding of the way several 
elements (R&D, H, L) contribute to growth and development, which is indeed we will 
turn to now. 
 
 
4  Long-run Equilibrium and R&D Switching 
 
The sequence of long-run equilibrium points is generated by the R&D sectors in our 
model. Recall that we assumed that basic and applied research sectors use research 
labor, a special type of labor endowed with frontier knowledge, in generating 
blueprints. The two R&D sectors compete for the ‘scarce’ research labor in the model. 
In this section we will show that this competition is linked to falling profit 
opportunities in the intermediate market, and that therefore drastic technologies are 
advanced in clusters. 
With respect to the generation of blueprints in the basic intermediate sector, we 
recall that they accumulate according to the following difference function: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
0 0 / / φ β α r Y K = straightforward to show that  . The ratio is constant for a constant r , which must be 
true, at least at long-run. 
18  
t B B t t B R B B δ = − +1            ( 2 3 )  
 
where as before   denotes the stock of basic innovations at time t and  t B B δ  is a 
productivity measure of research people employed in the basic sector ( ). Recall 
that the time index t identifies the moments in real time when basic innovations 
emerge. The way we defined the GPT generation mechanism is a simple difference 
equation and its solution is  . The mechanism generates (discrete) 
perpetual growth. In particular, the stock of GPTs increase at increasing rates at equal 
time distances. This result can be rationalized by the public good character of ideas 
(cf. Romer (1990)). 
B R
t
B B t R B ) 1 ( δ + =
The dynamics of the applied R&D sector are substantially different from that in the 
basic sector, even though the blueprint accumulation function resembles the 
accumulation function of the blueprints for the basic intermediary goods. We recall 
that the development over time of applied innovations does not depend on applied 
R&D efforts of previous GPTs, nor on the current applied R&D activities. The 
outcome of the applied R&D research is too specific to be directly useful for other 
applied research, though it is indirectly via the knowledge spill-overs that are reflected 
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where   denotes the stock of applied blueprints for the latest GPT bundle,  j n A δ  
represents the productivity of research labor employed ( ). Note that the time index 
we use is now 
A R
ω  (applied R&D time), which identifies the moments in real time 
when applied innovations materialize. Equation (24) says that the innovation process 
for the j
th blueprint will stop when each GPT (in the new bundle) gets one. 
The blueprint generation mechanism in equation (24) is a simple difference 
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given that n  is zero for all  0 , j j . According to equation (25), blueprints accumulate as 
a linear positive function of the amount of research labor used as long as it is less than 
number of GPTs produced in the most recent basic R&D activity. For clarity, we 
would like to illustrate equation (25) with an example. Suppose that the economy has 
just produced nine new GPT blueprints. Then, according to equations (24) and (25), 
the applied R&D has to produce nine units of blueprints for the first ( ) 
complementary intermediary, nine units of blueprints for the second complementary 
intermediary ( ), and so on. Furthermore, suppose that the applied R&D sector 
can produce three units of blueprint per applied R&D time 
1 = j
2 = j
ω  in accordance with 
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Figure 2. Blueprint accumulation in Applied R&D (an example) 
 
 
As both types of blueprint generation mechanisms require R&D labor in order to 
generate new blueprints, they are in competition with each other in attracting R. As 
usual, the proceeds of blueprints are paid as wages in the relevant R&D sector 
whenever R&D is undertaken. This implies that the wages paid in both sub-sectors of 
20 the R&D sector will play a decisive role in the distribution of R over both R&D 
activities. These, in turn, depend on the profitability of each sub-sector.  
Suppose that   has already been invented (thus given). The profits for the next 
basic R&D activity 
t B
0 , 1 + t π  would be 
 
B t t B B t t R w B R P 0 , 1 0 , 1 0 , 1 ) ( + + + − = δ π        ( 2 6 )  
 
where   is the price of a basic design in the next bundle, and   represents the 
wage rate of R&D labor in the basic R&D sector for the next generation of GPTs. 
Subscript zero indicates that the variable is related to basic R&D, and subscript t  
shows that drastic inventions are made between times 
0 , 1 + t P 0 , 1 + t w
1 +




t B t t B P w δ 0 , 1 0 , 1 + + = ,          ( 2 7 )  
 
a condition that must be satisfied when research staff is ever to be employed in the 
basic R&D. Note that the stock of   is taken as given as anyone engaging in basic 
research can freely take advantage of the entire existing stock of GPT blueprints. 
t B
Suppose again that   has already been invented. The profits of the j t B
j t R w ,
th design will 
be  A A t A j t j R B P, − = δ π  and the equilibrium process produces 
 
t A j t j t B P w δ , , = .     ,.... 2 , 1 = j     (27) 
 
where   is the price of the j j t P,
t
th complementary-good design,   is the rental rate of 
R&D labor in the j
j t w ,
th design, and   indexes the prevailing GPT bundle generated at 
times   and t . Equation (28) gives the wage rate   that the applied R&D sector 
must pay in order to undertake research in the sector for activity 
t
1 − j w
j . 
The comparison of wages between both types of R&D activities, therefore highly 
depends on the prices that new blueprints yield. In our set-up, the unit value of a new 
blueprint is equal to the present discounted value of profit stream generated in the 
intermediary sector, given that R&D sectors operate under perfect competition. The 
21 intuition is simple. Because the market for designs is competitive, the price for 
designs will be bid up until it is equal to the present value of the profit stream that a 
monopolist can extract. Hence, the price of each innovation, whether basic or applied, 
is equal to present discounted value of profit stream of the respective intermediary 
producer (cf. Romer (1990)). 
It is easy to calculate profit streams of intermediate sectors by using equations (19) 
and (21). Suppose that the basic R&D associated with  1 + t  has already been invented. 
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In Equation (29),   denotes the real time and  s τ  indicates the present. We assume that 
the growth dynamics of   and  L H  are known to the system (this assumption includes 
constant   and  L H ). It is critical to note that equation (29) is derived at equilibrium, 
meaning that the present value of profits received by the basic-intermediate producer 
is calculated under the assumption that   complementary goods for each GPT in the 
new cluster will have been produced. In other words, agents calculate the present 
value of profits as if they have already attained the next equilibrium point. Under 
perfect foresight assumption, this is not unrealistic at all, because it is easy to imagine 
that all GPT times here to infinity is the relevant comparison measure for making a 
decision for any agent what to invent next. 
n
Similarly, the present value of the j
th complementary-good at time τ , where the 






















































                                                           
9 For expositional purposes, we assume that r  is constant and   and  L H  are growing at exogenously 
given rates in equations (29) and (30). The switching mechanism is not dependent on this assumption. 
22 The most interesting property of discounted profit streams in (30) is its falling nature. 
In particular,   must be at the neighborhood of zero, given our assumption that 
the very last input share 
n t PV , 1 +
n α  is at the neighborhood of zero (i.e.,  ). 
Evidently, R&D people will stop working on the prevailing technological paradigm 
after producing the n
0 1 , 1 = + + n t PV
th blueprint under perfect foresight assumption. 
Recall that profit streams are captured by R&D people, independent of whether 
they are employed at basic R&D sector or at applied R&D sector (cf., equations (27) 
and (28)). Then, the falling nature of profit streams must be also reflected in the 
wages of R&D people employed in the applied sector. In particular, wages received 
by the R&D people working in the applied R&D must be falling as new blueprints for 
intermediaries are produced. This characteristic of our model is indeed the heart of 
cyclical advancement of technologies and long-run business cycles.  
To see this in more detail, we note that research labor decides on the use of their 
labor by comparing the real wages offered by the two research-sectors at any time. 
Given the linear blueprint production functions, all R&D people will be employed in 
only one sector, that is, only corner solutions are viable in the model (clearly, linearity 
is only for stylistic purposes). Suppose now that the basic R&D sector has just used 
the whole research staff. In particular, suppose that we have just produced the 
blueprint bundle for the basic intermediate of GPT  1 + t . The question is whether they 
would switch to produce complementary intermediaries for this GPT or switch to 
work on a new GPT bundle. In our set up, the following conditions must hold in order 
to make the switch to applied R&D work viable: 
 
0 , 2 , 1
0 , 2 2 , 1
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Equation (31) indicates that in order for a GPT bundle, say  t t B B − +1 , to be viable, 
then first and foremost the real wage offered by the applied R&D sector for the first 
complementary good must be higher than the wage rate offered by the basic R&D 
sector of the next GPT cluster, i.e.,  1 2 + + − t t B B . If this condition holds, then the entire 
research people will shift to applied research. The same condition must also hold for 
23 blueprints of intermediaries  . Nonetheless, there is always an end to this process. 
Our assumption that 
,.. 3 , 2
n α  is at the neighborhood of zero implies that   is also at the 
neighborhood of zero and hence the condition for switching back to basic research for 
the next GPT technology is always secured. It might be argued that the assumption 
that 
n t w , 1 +
n α  is at the neighborhood of zero is too strong. However, it must be noted that 
the genuine generator of the switching mechanism is not that assumption but the fact 
that profits in the complementary sector have a falling nature. Assuming that  n α  is at 
the neighborhood of zero only secures the constancy of number of varieties in the 
model, which is hardly restrictive for   being a large number.  n
w
0 > + t w
It is worth to mention that the wages in the R&D sector also experiences cycles. 
From equation (31) above, we know that   but wages decline (towards 
zero) as new intermediaries are produced. When the model-economy starts to produce 
the next generation GPT bundle, first research people’s wages experience  , 
which must satisfy,   and next a jump to  , where the latter can be 
substantially greater than the former. Then, it starts to fall again. This mechanism 
creates cycles in R&D wages, and none of these cycles necessarily produce similar 
wage rates as the stock of GPTs increase over time and if skilled labor and unskilled 
labor changes. 
0 , 2 1 , 1 + + > t t w w
+ t w
0 , 2 + t
0 , 2 1 , 2
 
 
5  Output Dynamics in the Long-run 
 
To look at the evolvement of long-run equilibria over time, we have to close the 
model with a demand side. There are two ways to close the model. First and foremost, 
in order to not further complicate the model, we may presume that consumption is 
determined by an exogenous saving rate. Interestingly, an exogenous saving rate 
assumption does not mean that the rate is assigned arbitrarily in our context. Quite the 
opposite, due to the way the model is constructed, the exogenous saving rate is 
determined from the model. To see this, first note that each GPT time refers also to a 
period, in which a group of basic intermediates are produced, that is, physical 
investment is made. For example, time  1 + t  refers also to the investment made in the 
24 amount  . Savings must balance this investment, instantaneously. In 
that respect, the saving rate is ex ante defined in our model. Details are as follows. 
Suppose that we denote the saving rate by, say 
) ( 1 0 , 1 t t t B B x − ⋅ + +
ψ . We conjecture that the saving rate 
would be identical and constant at GPT equilibrium points. To see this, using (22) and 
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B R H L g . Hence, under the small-country 
assumption, it is possible to close the model by 
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where   is consumption. Naturally, the fact that investment in the model is made 
only at GPT times does not mean that savings have to be also made only at these 
instances. Indeed, assuming a particular distribution of savings, which sums up 
exactly to the investment needs at GPT times is sufficient. 
Second, in accordance with intertemporal optimization of consumption 




where   is the discount factor,   is the subjective rate of time preference, 
 is the utility, 1  is the intertemporal elasticity of consumption, W  is 
the asset stock of the society, and   is the calendar time. The maximization yields 
. The critical characteristic of our modeling approach that has to be 
recalled is the fact that the r  is determined in such a way that also assures 
25 consumption is equal to output minus net investment (i.e., in Romer-based setups, the 






Since our model does not allow us to look at transitional analysis in-between GPT 
times (see also the discussion below on the broader concept of output), we can only 
look at the determination of r  at GPT times. A balanced growth implies that 
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If   and  L H  are constants, then the right-hand side is  ] 1 ) 1 (
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and 
L
H  are growing, then the right-hand side becomes 
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χ 1+ . The left hand side is  . The 
implicit solution of this difference equation defines the time path of 
θ θ µ ) 1 ( t r +
r  at GPT times. 
Finally, we may discuss the time profile of output and the growth rate of the 
economy. We focus on those results that assumes constant r , as it allows for a 
tractable solution. Firstly, from equation (22), we observe that GPT equilibrium 
experiences ‘jumps’ at GPT times due to the fact that the number of composite input 
varieties increases. If   and  L H  are constants, then the growth rate of output is 
 for a constant  ] 1 ) − + =
χ δ B BR g r . If   and  L H  are growing, then the growth rate 
of output is  .  ] 1 − ) 1 ( + +
− χ





L 1 [( + = g δ BR
Secondly, analogous to our previous analysis, it is not possible to determine the 
complete time profile of output at in-between GPT times in our model. This is 
because our model actually features two types of output: equilibrium (GPT) output Y  
and the transitional output or the broader concept of output  . Q
10 In our context, the 
former is associated with GPT equilibrium points of final goods production, whereas 
the latter refers to values of output in-between GPT equilibrium points. To see why it 
is not easy to calculate transitional output, let us illustrate it by an example. Suppose 
that the model economy has just realized Y . Say at the next real time,  , the  t 1 + s
26 economy will generate the next GPT bundle,  t t B B − +1 , and hence  1 + ∆ t B  units of core 
intermediaries   are associated with the recent bundle. Clearly, the broader 
concept of output is not )
0 , 1 + t x
( 1 t t B B 0 , 1 1 t t s x Y Q − ⋅ + = + + +  because (i) all production 
activities of existing GPTs are affected inversely by addition of a new intermediary 
and (ii) skilled and unskilled labor may be growing. Hence, the exact time profile of 
the broader concept of output is function of B ,   and  L H . To see this, suppose first 
that   and  L H  are constant. Then, from t to  1 + t , more intermediaries will use the 
fixed supply of H  and therefore output per complementary intermediary will fall. On 
the other hand, production of new intermediaries,  ) t B ( 1 , t j B 1 t x − ⋅ + + , implies an 
increase in the transitional output. This suggests that that the transitional output may 
fall or rise, depending on the ‘cost’ of producing new complementary intermediaries 
in terms of the reduction in the volume of all composite intermediaries. When   and  L
H  are growing during that period, the transitional output is enhanced directly by 
higher   and indirectly by higher  L H  (as the volume of composite intermediaries may 
increase). Hence, our model indicates that output may decline or rise at the onset of a 
new GPT, depending on B ,   and  L H . 
L H
The policy implication of this finding is that the time profile of output will (almost 
certainly) be positive in the transitional period, if   and   are growing. This finding 
suggests that if the policy maker is able to match the additional demand to skilled 
labor at times that there is a growing demand for them, then it is possible to smooth 
out long run business cycles, which will both lead to higher levels of output and 





This study showed that exhausting profits in the incremental technologies with the 
existing technological paradigm could be the source of long-run business cycles. New 
technological paradigms are advanced cyclically because R&D activities focus on the 
existing technological paradigm as long as there remain positive profit opportunities 
                                                                                                                                                                      
10 See Chapter 5 of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) on the broader concept of output. We exploit this 
term in our paper for presentational purposes. Otherwise, the use has no analogy. 
27 on it. Focus returns to basic R&D whenever the profit opportunities of the next bundle 
of drastic technologies are higher than that of the existing paradigm. Switching 
between the basic and applied technologies creates long-run cycles in the economy. 
The paper showed also that temporary falls in growth at the onset of a new 
technological paradigm might be because the pace of growth of inputs was not 
meeting the additional resource needs created by the new paradigm.  
This paper has many possible extensions. First and foremost, we did not look into 
the policy implications of Kondratieff cycles analytically. We showed that these 
cycles are generated endogenously due to market opportunities. If the market 
opportunities arising with new technological paradigms do not quickly indulge the 
input markets to enhance the arising demand, there is room for policy maneuvers in 
the sense that the growth of these inputs can be induced by necessary policy actions. 
We left this question analytically untreated in this study. Secondly, we assume that the 
forthcoming technological paradigms have no impact on the ‘performance’ of the 
existing technological paradigms. This may be true in some cases but not necessarily 
in all instances. This argument is true for both basic and applied technologies. A 
recent invention in basic technology or in applied technology may find its place also 
in improving productivity of a previous applied technology. We ignored these 
backward linkages in this study. Thirdly, for matter of tractability, we imposed a 
constant number of intermediaries within each paradigm. A demanding extension is to 
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